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SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND THE ANTI-TRUST
LAWS: A GUIDE FOR THE PRACTICING ATTORNEY
Reconciliation of the federal antitrust legislation' and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 19342 has posed a difficult problem for the courts. Although
the purpose of both statutory schemes-service to the public-is identical,
the two are mutually conflicting. The Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts
attempt to effectively eliminate all unreasonable restraints on competition
in order to achieve the most efficient allocation of goods and services at the
lowest price; the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 envisions a policy of self-
regulation by the registered securities exchanges, the effects of which are
often anticompetitive. In fact the New York Stock Exchange's policy of re-
stricting membership and setting minimum commission rates by member bro-
kerage firms are classic examples of "exclusion of competitors" and "hori-
zontal price fixing" 3-- conduct which would constitute per se violations of the
antitrust laws absent the sanction of another regulatory statute.
4
To understand the complexity of the task of reconciliation which con-
fronts the courts it is essential to recall basic principles of antitrust law
and the history of the New York Stock Exchange. The Sherman Act orig-
inally enacted in 1890 clearly prohibited any combination or conspiracy to re-
strain trade.5 Later the Supreme Court, engaging in judicial legislation,
interpreted the Sherman Act to prohibit monopolies and trade restraining
combinations which were unreasonable under the circumstances.6 This
gloss on the statute which became known as "the rule of reason" was refined
and clarified in United States v. Trenton Potteries7 which held that agree-
ments which set prices are unreasonable in themselves without inquiry into
whether the prices agreed to are reasonable under the circumstances. And
so arose the distinction in antitrust law between conduct which is unreason-
able under the circumstances and conduct which is unreasonable per se.
1. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1970). Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §
12-21, 22-27 (1970).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 77b et seq. (1970).
3. Hensley, Application of Antitrust Law to the Securities Industry, 10 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 136, 140 (1968).
4. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 347 (1963).
5. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
6. The fundamental principal for determining the legality of conduct under the
Sherman Act was announced in Standard Oil v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911), where the court
held that section 1 of the Sherman Act reached only undue or unreasonable restraints.
Certain arrangements, however, are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable restraints
of trade simply by virtue of their obvious and necessary affects on competition. An
example of such an arrangement is price-fixing.
7. 273 U.S. 392 (1926).
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Various practices of the exchanges which would otherwise be classified
as per se violations of the Sherman Act have been part of the organizational
structure of the New York Stock Exchange since its formation 1792. The
historic Buttonwood Agreement executed by the original broker members of
the New York Stock Exchange provided:
We do . . .hereby solemnly promise . . . that we will not buy or
sell . . . for any person . . . any kind of Public Stock at a rate
less than one-quarter percent of commission . . .and that we will
give a preference to each other in our Negotiations. In Testi-
mony whereof we have set our hands this 17th day of May, at
New York, 1792.8
From its very beginning the exchange possessed the characteristics of a pri-
vate cartel: limited and selective membership, fixed minimum commission
rates and other practices antithetical to the goals of a competitive economy. 9
After the stock market crash in 1929 abuses existing in the securities industry
became patently obvious. Mindful both of the need to protect investors
from the unethical practices of bucket shops and boiler shops' ° and also of
the important functions the exchanges played in maintaining the liquidity
of publicly-held securities and in providing a source of large sums of cap-
ital, Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1934.11
The relationship between the Commission and the exchanges is a unique one
indeed. Rather than imposing specific rules on the exchanges, the Act
places an affirmative duty on the exchanges to register with the commission'
2
and conditions the registration on an agreement by the exchange "to enforce
. . .compliance by its members"' 3 with SEC regulations and to file its con-
8. SEC, REPORTS OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKET, H.R. Doc. No. 95,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 295 (1963).
9. See generally Baxter, NYSE Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes Public,
22 STAN. L. REV. 675, 676 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Baxter].
10. A boiler shop is a small operation which employs high pressure telephone
salesmanship to oversell the public. A bucket shop is an office or place (other than
a regularly incorporated or licensed exchange) where persons engage in pretend buying
and selling of commodities.
11. See generally Jennings, Sell-Regulation in the Securities Industry: The Role
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 663 (1964).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78e (1970):
It shall be unlawful for any broker, dealer, or exchange, directly or indirectly,
to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce for the purpose of using any facility of an exchange within or subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States to effect any transaction in a security,
or to report any such transaction, unless such exchange (1) is registered as
a national securities exchange under section 78f of this title, or (2) is exempt
from such registration upon application by the exchange because, in the opin-
ion of the Commission, by reason of the limited volume of transactions effected
on such exchange, it is not practicable and not necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors to require such registration.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1970):
(a) Any exchange may be registered with the Commission as a national se-
curities exchange under the terms and conditions hereinafter provided in this
section, by filing a registration statement in such form as the Commission may
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stitution and rules with the SEC. 14 The exchange will be registered only if
its rules are "just and adequate to insure fair dealing and to protect invest-
ors."'15 Thus the statute evidences a policy of allowing exchanges wide lati-
tude in formulating rules regarding their self-regulation, subject however, to
SEC surveillance in the interest of market stability. That policy was suc-
cinctly described by William 0. Douglas, once chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission:
[The intention was one of] letting the exchange take the leadership
with government playing a residual role. Government would keep
the shotgun so to speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled,
prescribe, containing the agreements, setting forth the information, and accom-
panied by the documents, below specified:
(1) An agreement (which shall not be construed as a waiver of any constitu-
tional right or any right to contest the validity of any rule or regulation) to
comply, and to enforce as far as is within its powers compliance by its mem-
bers, with the provisions of this chapter, and any amendment thereto and any
rule or regulation made or to be made thereunder;
(2) Such data as to its organization, rules or procedure, and membership, and
such other information as the Commission may by rules and regulations re-
quire as being necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of investors;
(3) Copies of its constitution, articles of incorporation with all amendments
thereto, and of its existing bylaws or rules or instruments corresponding
thereto, whatever the name, which are hereinafter collectively referred to as
the "rules of the exchange"; and
(4) An agreement to furnish to the Commission copies of any amendments
to the rules of the exchange forthwith upon their adoption.
(b) No registration shall be granted or remain in force unless the rules of the
exchange include provision of the expulsion, suspension, or disciplining of a
member for conduct or proceeding inconsistent with just and equitable princi-
ples of trade, and declare that the willful violation of any provisions of this
chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder shall be considered conduct or
proceeding inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade.
(c) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent any exchange from
adopting and enforcing any rule not inconsistent with this chapter and the rules
and regulations thereunder and the applicable laws of the State in which it is
located.
(d) If it appears to the Commission that the exchange applying for registra-
tion is so organized as to be able to comply with the provisions of this chapter
and the rules and regulations thereunder and that the rules of the exchange
are just and adequate to insure fair dealing and to protect investors, the Com-
mission shall cause such exchange to be registered as a national securities ex-
change.
(e) Within thirty days after the filing of the application, the Commission shall
enter an order either granting or, after appropriate notice and opportunity for
hearing, denying registration as a national securities exchange, unless the ex-
change applying for registration shall withdraw its application or consent to
the Commission's deferring action on its application for a stated longer period
after the date of filing. The filing with the Commission of an application for
registration by an exchange shall be deemed to have taken place upon the re-
ceipt thereof. Amendments to an application may be made upon such terms
as the Commission may prescribe.
(f) An exchange may, upon appropriate application in accordance with the
rules and regulations of the Commission, and upon such terms as the Commis-





cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would never have to be
used."'
Pursuant to its role as watchdog, section 19(b) of the 1934 Act provides that
The Commission is . . . authorized . . . to alter or supple-
ment the rules of . . . an exchange . . . in respect of such
matters as (1) safeguards in respect of the financial responsibility
of members and adequate provision against the evasion of finan-
cial responsibility through the use of corporate forms or special
partnerships; (2) the limitation or prohibition of the registration or
trading in any security within a specified period after the issuance
or primary distribution thereof; (3) the listing or striking from
listing of any security; (4) hours of trading; (5) the manner,
method, and place of soliciting business; (6) fictitious or num-
bered accounts; (7) the time and method of making settlements,
payments, and deliveries and of closing accounts; (8) the report-
ing of transactions on the exchange and upon tickers maintained
by or with the consent of the exchange, including the method of
reporting short sales, stopped sales, sales of securities of issuers in
default, bankruptcy or receivership, and sales involving other spe-
cial circumstances; (9) the fixing of reasonable rates of commis-
sion, interest, listing, and other charges; (10) minimum units of
trading; (11) odd-lot purchases and sales; (12) minimum depos-
its on margin accounts; and (13) similar matters. 17
Section 19(a) authorizes the SEC to suspend an exchange for a period
not exceeding twelve months for violations of any rule or failure to enforce
compliance with those rules by a member.' 8 The 1934 Act thus establishes
a tri-partite relationship between member firms, an exchange and the SEC.
Broker-dealers are required to comply with the constitution and rules of the
exchange of which they are a member. In turn the exchange is free to es-
tablish its own rules and regulations but the 1934 Act requires that all ex-
changes register with the SEC. The quid pro quo of registration is that the
exchange's rules be "just and adequate to insure fair dealing in the securities
industry."' 9 Section 19(b) is of particular importance as it maintains spe-
cific areas in which the SEC has authority to order changes in exchange rules
subsequent to its registration. The Act does not, however, authorize SEC
jurisdiction over particular application of those rules by member ex-
changes. This "rule" versus "application of the rule" dichotomy has been
16. W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (Allen ed. 1940).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(1) (1970):
(a) The Commission is authorized, if in its opinion such action is necessary
or appropriate for the protection of investors-
(1) After appropriate notice and opportunity for hearing, by order to suspend
for a period not exceeding twelve months or to withdraw the registration of
a national securities exchange if the Commission finds that such exchange has
violated any provision of this chapter or of the rules and regulations thereunder
or has failed to enforce, so far as is within its power, compliance therewith
by a member or by an issuer of a security registered thereon.
19. 15 T.S.C. 78f(b) (1970).
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utilized by the courts in its reconciliation of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and the antitrust laws.
The relationship between the two statutes has confronted the appellate
courts few -times since 1934, and the majority of those cases have been ar-
gued in the Seventh Circuit. An analysis of those Seventh Circuit cases
beginning with the Supreme Court's only treatment of the issue in Silver v.
New York Stock Exchange20 will indicate the course the practicing attorney
should adopt in steering his way through the "regulatory Scylla" and the "an-
titrust Charybdis."
THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
In 1963, the Supreme Court first considered the relationship between
these two statutory schemes in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange.2 1 The
plaintiff Harold Silver, was a securities dealer trading in corporate over-the-
counter issues, but he was not a member of the New York Stock Exchange.
Since instantaneous communication with exchange member firms is of para-
mount importance for a broker dealing in over-the-counter issues, Silver ar-
ranged for private wires to ten exchange member firms. In 1958, pursuant
to exchange rules,2 2 member firms received temporary approval of the con-
nection between them and Silver's firm. In February 1959, without prior
notice to Silver, the exchange's Department of Member Firms sent notice to
the member firms involved, instructing them to terminate the wire connec-
tions. Silver sought an explanation from the exchange but received none.
Alleging that his business decreased substantially because of the firm's in-
ability to obtain quotations quickly and because of the stigma attached to the
exchange's disapproval, Silver sued the NYSE for treble damages 23 under the
federal antitrust laws charging that the exchange's action amounted to a
group boycott.
Writing for the majority Mr. Justice Goldberg put the issue squarely be-
fore the court:
The fundamental issue confronting us is whether the Securities
Exchange Act has created a duty of Exchange self-regulation so
pervasive as to constitute an implied repealer of the antitrust laws,
thereby exempting the Exchange from liability in this and similar
cases.
24
The Court noted, however, that the statutory scheme of the Exchange Act
20. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 344.
23. Silver alleged that the defendant exchange violated sections 1 & 2 of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act.
24. 373 U.S. at 347,
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was not pervasive enough to create the total antitrust immunity which ex-
isted in other regulated industries. The very nature of the securities industry
is not conducive to the kind of regulation implying exemption. 25 Rather the
test to be applied by the courts is: "Repeal of the Federal antitrust laws is
to be regarded as implied only if necessary to make the Securities Exchange
Act work, and even then only to the minimum extent necessary"26 Pointing
out that the action of the exchange and its members firms in refusing to deal
with Silver would have constituted a per se violation of section one of the
Sherman Act absent justification derived from the policy of another regula-
tory scheme,27 the court noted that article 3, section 6 of the NYSE consti-
tution provides that the exchange "shall have power to approve or disap-
prove an application for . . . wire connection between any member of the
exchange . . . and any non-member firm and may require the discontinu-
ance of any such service."'2 8 Although the commission can require the ex-
change to formulate such rules, it does not have jurisdiction to review the
particular application of those rules in a given instance. Thus in Silver the
only issue was whether this particular instance of exchange self-regulation
was necessary to make the act work:
[I]t is clear that no justification can be offered for self-regulation
conducted without provision for some method of telling a protest-
ing nonmember why a rule is being invoked so as to harm him
. . . No policy reflected in the Securities Exchange Act is served
by denial of notice and an opportunity for a hearing. 29
Since the challenged conduct would be a violation of the Sherman Act un-
less justified by reference to the self-regulatory goals of the Exchange Act,
and since there was no purpose of the Act furthered by anticompetitive col-
lective action taken without according fair procedures, the Securities Ex-
change Act was not a viable defense to an antitrust claim. The court then
pointed out that even though the antitrust laws do not impose a duty of no-
tice, the exchange's conduct exceeded the scope of its authority to engage in
self-regulation, and therefore, had not even reached the preliminary justifi-
cation for what would otherwise be an antitrust violation.3 0
The Court's treatment of Silver hints at the dual pronged analysis re-
quired in reconciling the two statutes. The initial analysis required is a pro-
cedural one. If the conduct allegedly violating federal antitrust law is
within the scope of review by the Securities and Exchange Commission, then
primary jurisdiction lies in the Commission rather than in the antitrust
25. See generally Hale and Hale, Competition or Control VI: Application of Anti-
trust laws to Regulated Industries, 111 U. OF PA. L. REv. 46 (1962); Asch, Antitrust
Laws and Regulated Securities Market, 11 ANTrrmusT BULL. 209 (1967).
26. 373 U.S. at 357.
27. Id. at 347.
28. Id. at 355 n.ll.
29. Id. at 361.
30. Id. at 365,
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court.31 Although Silver does not specifically articulate this approach (since
the SEC lacked jurisdiction over the application of a rule to a particular in-
stance) the court implies it:
Although the Act gives -the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion power to request exchanges to make changes in their rules
and impliedly therefore to disapprove any rules adopted by an
exchange, it does not give the Commission jurisdiction to re-
view a particular instance of enforcement of exchange rules ....
This aspect of the statute . . . obviates any need to consider
whether petitioners were required to resort to the Commission
for relief before coming into court . . . . Moreover the Com-
mission's lack of jurisdiction over particular application of ex-
change rules means that the question of antitrust exemption does
not involve any problem of conflict or co-extensiveness of cov-
erage with the agency's regulatory power.
3 2
This passage, along with footnote # 12 in Silver:33
Were there Commission jurisdiction and ensuing judicial review for
scrutiny of a particular exchange rule . . . a different case would
arise concerning exemption from the operation of laws designed to
prevent anticompetitive activity ....
have been read by defendant exchanges in subsequent cases to imply that if
there were SEC jurisdiction to review the challenged rule, then conduct au-
thorized by the rule is immune to antitrust liability. Their syllogistic argu-
ment is: Silver holds that the antitrust laws are to be regarded as im-
pliedily repealed only if necessary to make the Exchange Act work; the SEC
cannot perform its regulatory function unless there is antitrust immunity for
conduct subject to Commission review; and therefore, conduct subject to
Commission review is pro tanto immune from antitrust liability. But this in-
terpretation of these passages in Silver is incorrect. Subsequent decisions by
the Supreme Court on the relationship between the antitrust laws and the
Commodity Exchange Commission supports this assertion.
In Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange3 4 plaintiff claimed that his
membership on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange was transferred to another
without notice or hearing. The difference between this case and Silver was
that the specific Commodity Exchange Commission rule plaintiff alleged was
violated by defendant exchange was within the review jurisdiction of the
31. 17 § 201.4 C.F.R. specifies:
Any person desiring the. . . amendment or repeal of a rule of general applica-
tion may file a petition therefore with the Secretary of the Commission. Such
petition shall include a statement setting forth the text ... of the rule the re-
peal of which is desired and stating the nature of his interest and his reason
for seeking the . . . repeal of the rule. The Secretary shall acknowledge re-
ceipt of the petition and refer it to the Commission for such action as the
Commission deems appropriate, and shall notify the petitioner of the action
taken by the Commission.
32. 373 U.S. at 357-58.
33. Id. at 358.
34. 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
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Commodity Exchange Commission. 5 Noting that this was "that different
case" referred to in Silver the court held that the antitrust action should be
stayed pending the administrative agency's review.8 6 Thus the "difference"
in the cases refers only to the jurisdictional issue and the necessity of defer-
ring to administrative expertise. The quoted passages should not be inter-
preted to imply that review jurisdiction by the SEC cloaks the challenged
conduct in anti-trust immunity. The court in Ricci points out that the ad-
ministrative review is subject, however, to scrutiny by the antitrust court:
We make no claim that the Commission has authority to decide
either the question of immunity . . . or that any rule of, the
[Commodity] Exchange takes precedence over antitrust policies.
Rather we simply recognize that Congress has established a spe-
cialized agency that would determine either that a membership rule
of the Exchange has been violated or that it has been followed...
and either determination will be of great help to the antitrust court
in arriving at the essential accommodation between the antitrust
laws and the regulatory regime. The problem disappears entirely
if it is found that there has been a violation of a rule; on the other
hand if it is found that the Exchange has merely followed and
enforced its own rules, the antitrust court will be in a position to
make a more intelligent and sensitive judgment as to whether the
antitrust laws will punish what an apparently valid rule of the 'Ex-
change permits.
37
The court in Silver and in Ricci imply the need for application of the doc-
trine of primary jurisdiction 8 in this task of reconciliation. Application of
the doctrine to the SEC would require the antitrust court to defer action in
those specific areas mentioned in section 19(b)39 of the 1934 Act over which
the Commission has power to order changes. Relief would not be limited to
an administrative remedy, however. Judicial intervention in the form of sub-
sequent appellate review is available.
40
Resolution of the jurisdictional issue, however, does not dispose of the
second prong of the analysis, the substantive issue of whether or not a partic-
ular instance of exchange self-regulation is a defense to an antitrust claim.
That the issue was not decided in Silver is evidenced by the concurring opin-
ion written by Mr. Justice Burger in Ricci:
As I read the Court's opinion, it plainly disclaims any resolution
of the issue left open in Silver-namely the question of which par-
ticular instances of exchange self-regulation occurring within a stat-
35. Id. at 299.
36. Id. at 302.
37. Id. at 307.
38. Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An
Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARv. L. REv. 436, 464 (1953).
39. See text of section 19b preceding note 17 supra.
40. Petitioner could seek review of the administrative agency's determination under
the ADMIMSRATIVE PROqEDUE AcT, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
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utory scheme providing for self-regulation may be regarded as 'jus-
tified in answer to the assertion of an antitrust claim' against the
Exchange and its members.
41
Although Silver did not decide which instances of exchange self-regulation
were a defense to an antitrust claim, it did enunciate the test for deciding the
issue. 42 The meaning of the phrase "necessary to make the act work" is a
difficult issue, however. The following summary of Seventh Circuit cases
will indicate its adoption of an interpretation synonymous with "necessary to
protect the investing public."
SEVENTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS
In Kaplan v. Lehman Brothers,43 plaintiff alleged that the practice of
exchange member firms fixing minimum commission rates amounted to a per
se violation of the antitrust laws. Reading Silver to say that action taken
by the exchange and its member firms pursuant to its statutory duty of self-
regulation is not illegal per se, the court noted that the Commission had im-
plied power under section 19(b)(9)4 4 to fix minimum rates and, therefore,
according to Silver such conduct does not constitute a per se violation of the
Sherman act because of the simultaneous applicability of the Exchange
Act.
45
The Kaplan decision is a dissatisfying one because of the court's nar-
row construction of the plaintiff's pleadings. 46  The court did not decide
whether or not the minimum commission rate structure is necessary to
make the act work as Silver requires. Section 19(b)(9) authorizes the fixing
of "reasonable rates" and not "minimum rates" of commission, and in the
absence of clear congressional sanction of the latter, Kaplan should have
decided whether or not minimum commission rates which regulate competi-
tion between brokers rather than "protect investors" or "insure fair and ade-
quate dealing in securities traded on an exchange" are necessary to make
the act work.
47
41. 409 U.S. at 308.
42. 373 U.S. at 357: "Repeal of the Federal Antitrust laws is to be regarded as
implied only if necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work and even then only
to the minimum extent necessary."
43. 250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ill. 1966), aff'd, 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 954 (1967).
44. See text of section 19b preceding note 17 supra.
45. 373 U.S. at 347.
46. 250 F. Supp. at 564: "The plaintiffs have cast their lots entirely upon their
proposition that the fixing of minimum commission rates through the collective action
of the Exchange is illegal per se . . . if such action is within the authority conferred
upon the Exchange by the Act of 1934, however, the precedent of the Silver decision
stands squarely against them."
47. Nerenburg, Application of the Antitrust Laws to the Securities Field, 16 C^Ag
W. RFs. L. REV. 131, 150-151 (1964).
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Kaplan provides an instructive lesson for the practicing attorney:
pleading a per se violation of the antitrust laws for conduct authorized by
section 19(b) assures summary judgment because the per se theory of
antitrust liability is tantamount to a complete ouster of the Securities and Ex-
change Act. The teaching of Silver explicitly repudiates that conclusion and
specifies that reconciliation of the two statutes is the touchstone of judicial
review.
The second appellate case decided in the Seventh Circuit was Thill Se-
curities Corporation v. New York Stock Exchange.48  Thill was a licensed
securities dealer, but was not a member of the NYSE. Plaintiff alleged
that adherence to the anti-rebate rule which prohibited a member firm from
sharing a commission earned from the purchase or sale of securities with a
non-member even though the latter may have furnished the order, was an il-
legal restraint of trade. The NYSE argued that the exchange enjoyed broad
immunity from antitrust liability since the 1934 Act authorized registered ex-
changes to adopted rules regarding the fixing of reasonable rates of commis-
sion subject to review and revision by the SEC. This immunity, it argued,
extended beyond the fixing of rates and included rules relating to the shar-
ing of commissions because the prohibition against sharing commissions with
non-members is an integral part of fixing reasonable rates. 49  Since the SEC
has exclusive jurisdiction over this anti-rebate rule, defendant argued that the
conduct was immune. NYSE based its argument on the intimation in Sil-
ver that "a different case would arise" concerning anti-trust exemption if
there were commission jurisdiction. The exchange argued that this was that
different case and that the conduct was immune. The majority opinion in
Thill rejected defendant's interpretation and plainly stated that Silver indi-
cates that a reconciliation of the two statutes is not foreclosed simply be-
cause of SEC review of exchange self-regulation under section 19(b). 50
Rather the burden is on the exchange to establish that its exemption is nec-
essary to discharge its responsibility which is to "protect investors" and "in-
48. 43 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970).
49. Id. at 266.
50. The court's rejection of the defendant's argument that the existence of SEC ju-
risdiction to review rules authorizing the challenged conduct ipso facto established anti-
trust immunity was based on the Supreme Court's decision in United Staes v. Philadel-
phia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). Under the Bank Merger Act of 1960 the
Comptroller of the Currency was required by statute to consider the competitive effects
of the proposed merger of the Philadelphia National and Girard Bank. Even though
the Comptroller had approved the merger the court sustained the Justice Department's
attack of the merger under § 25 of the Clayton Act. Analogizing the SEC's review ju-
risdiction under § 19b of the Exchange Act to that of the Comptroller's jurisdiction under
the Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(4), the court in Thill held that in the case
of the SEC there was even a stronger reason for rejecting the defendant's contention
since unlike the Comptroller, the SEC is not required by statute to consider the anti-
competitive effects of its determinations. If the SEC does not perform the antitrust
function then the court must.
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sure fair and adequate dealing in the securities industry."5 1 The majority
in Thill did not divide the issue into its jurisdictional and substantive ele-
ments, but Judge Swygert pointed out the necessity to do in his concurring
opinion written three years before the Supreme Court indicated in Ricci that
it was the correct analysis.
52
It is interesting to note that a second circuit court on facts similar to
those in Thill accepted the argument advanced by the NYSE in Thill that
conduct within the purview of section 19(b) is immune to antitrust attack.
In Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange,5 3 plaintiff and the league of in-
dependent investors challenged the minimum commission rate rule alleging
that the fixed minimum rates were unreasonable under the circumstances
5 4
and constituted a scheme of price fixing contrary to sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act."5 The court in Gordon accepted the argument that had
been advanced by the NYSE in Thill but did not rest its decision solely on
its interpretation of the language in Silver;5 6 it stressed that the legislative
history of the 1934 Act indicated a congressional intent that broad responsi-
bility for self-regulation be vested in the exchanges. The final premise in
its argument was that the enactment of the Exchange Act which vested the
SEC with power to authorize exchanges "to fix reasonable rates of commis-
sion" indicated a congressional recognition of the Commission's competence
to serve the antitrust function of preserving competition inasmuch as United
States v. Trenton Potteries,57 decided seven years before the enactment of
the Exchange Act, held that price-fixing was illegal per se.
This second circuit decision is subject to criticism in terms of the analy-
sis developed by the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court. The passage
in Silver upon which Gordon relies deals only with the jurisdictional prong of
the issue and was not intended to resolve the substantive issue of antitrust im-
munity for conduct under section 19(b) .58 The decision in Ricci clearly
mandates that interpretation of the passage. Furthermore even though the
Exchange Act clearly authorizes self-regulation by the exchanges, that pol-
icy does not necessarily imply antitrust immunity as Gordon holds. The leg-
islative history of the Exchange Act focuses on eliminating the dishonesty,
manipulation and insolvency in brokerage houses that had such a disasterous
effect on the investing public and on the formation of capital in 1929. Its
51. 433 F.2d at 269.
52. Id. at 275.
53. 261 SEC REG. AND L. REP. (July 17, 1974).
54. Gordon is analogous to Kaplan, although the plaintiff here did not plead a per
se violation as in Kaplan.
55. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
56. Gordon interprets Silver to imply that unless rules subject to SEC jurisdiction
under § 19b are not immune to antitrust attack, the Exchange Act cannot work. Ricci
indicates this is not the correct interpretation of the passage in Silver.
57. 273 U.S. 392 (1926).
58. See text of section 19b preceding note 17 supra.
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primary concern was not the anticompetitive effects of the securities legisla-
tion.59 Acceptance, therefore, of the Gordon premise that conduct subject
to SEC review under section 19(b) is immune to antitrust attack because that
immunity is necessary to make the act work not only fails to comport with
the "close analysis and delicate weighing process mandated by. . .Silver"60
but it also misinterprets the legislative history. Since the late nineteenth
century a presumption in favor of competition has pervaded the economic
legislation of this nation and that presumption should not be negated with-
out evidence of explicit congressional intent to the contrary. 6l
In the most recent case dealing with these two statutes, Zuckerman v.
Yount,62 plaintiff's agent was a broker who sought membership on the Mid-
west Stock Exchange. His membership was initially denied for reasons which
he alleged were part of a conspiracy to restrain trade. The Midwest Ex-
change was named a defendant for its alleged part in furthering the conspir-
acy initiated by his competitors. Although the exchange denied plaintiff
membership, they did notify him of all information63 the executive commit-
tee had acted upon in its denial of membership. Plaintiff appealed and was
subsequently granted membership subject to a probationary period. Finding
this unacceptable, he sued the exchange. On a motion for summary judgment
defendant argued it had acted pursuant to its statutorily imposed duty of self-
regulation, and that pro tanto there is an implied waiver of antitrust liabil-
ity. Alternatively, the exchange argued that even if there were no repeal
of the antitrust laws they were not liable since they granted plaintiff pro-
cedural due process. 64 'Relying on Silver the court denied the motion and
pointed out that the 1934 Act contained no express exemption from anti-
trust liability and that repeal was to be regarded as implied only if necessary
to make the Securities Exchange Act work. As in Thill the exchange had
failed to show that the rules allegedly violated by the plaintiff were neces-
sary to the operation of the 1934 Act; the Securities Act was therefore not a
defense to the antitrust action.
Impliediy referring to the procedural issue, the court noted that the
59. See Baxter, supra note 9, at 684-685.
60. See Chief Justice Warren's dissent from the Supreme Court's denial of Certio-
rari in Kaplan. "The court below, in a two-page opinion, held that a repeal of the anti-
trust laws was required to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and that the self-
regulatory function of the exchange has been exercised by virtue of § 19b. In my view,
this blunderbuss approach falls far short of the close analysis and delicate weighing
process mandated by this Court's opinion in Silver." 389 U.S. at 957-58.
61. See Baxter, supra note 9, at 685.
62. 362 F. Supp. 858 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
63. Defendant had charged plaintiff with (1) having made several unnecessary and
exaggerated requests to bid up a stock in which he was a co-specialist, in violation of
rule 9 of article XXIV of the Midwest Stock Exchange Rules; (2) failing to maintain
an orderly market by reason of large spreads between bid and ask quotations; (3) using
strong and profane language on the floor of the Exchange.
64. 362 F. Supp. at 860, 861.
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SEC lacked review jurisdiction over the application of the specific rule alleg-
edly violated and therefore the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not ap-
ply.6 5 Furthermore, the court said, the affording of procedural due process
did not ipso facto cloak the exchange with immunity. According to Silver
that is merely a matter of threshold justification and is not dispositive of the
issue. 6
SUMMARY
These Seventh Circuit cases and the supreme court decisions in Silver
and Ricci point out a method of analysis for the practicing attorney. If the
SEC has jurisdiction to review the challenged conduct under section 19(b),
his initial remedy must be sought from the Securities Exchange Commission.
But SEC jurisdiction is not preclusive jurisdiction-subsequent appellate re-
view by the antitrust court is available. In deferring to the administrative
agency the court has the ultimate authority to shape the general outlines of
economic policy rather than allowing an agency which is generally sympa-
thetic to the securities industry to do so. In a pluralistic society this is a de-
sirable result since the full panoply of competing economic theories will be
considered in a system where the court is subject to public scrutiny.
6 7
Once the court takes cognizance of the antitrust claim, defendant has
the onerous burden of showing that the challenged conduct is necessary to
make the Exchange Act work. Can defendant merely point to SEC power of
review over the challenged conduct? Can he argue that if that fact alone
does not cloak the conduct in antitrust immunity the Exchange Act will not
work? Silver answers no, and Ricci says that merely solves the jurisdictional
issue. It does not solve the substantive issue of what conduct is necessary to
make the Act work. The court has not answered this question specifically
but its philosophy suggests an answer: the goal of the Securities Exchange
Act is protection of the investing public. But how would the court apply this
principal? In each case it would be a question of fact. With respect to the is-
sue of minimum commission rates, for example, the court must determine if
the investor is protected by a rule which allows marginal brokerage houses to
continue in business and also diverts customers to the over-the-counter mar-
ket, an action which erodes the primary market and impairs the liquidity of
publicly-traded securities. On the other hand, the court must consider if the
significant attrition of inefficient brokerage firms6 8 will not have an unsett-
ling effect on the market and will ultimately involve large economic losses to
the investor. There is no easy answer to this issue, but these are the kinds
of matters the court would consider. Indeed it is a troublesome problem
65. Id. at 862.
66. Id. at 863.
67. See generally Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory
Policies, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1207 (1969).
68. See generally Godwin, Antitrust and the Stock Exchange: Minimum Commis-
sion or Free Competition, 18 STAN. L. REv. 213 (1965).
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with extensive political overtones. Finally to complete the practitioner's
chart, mention must be made of the situation in which the SEC lacks juris-
diction to review application of a specific rule as it did in Silver and in
Zuckerman. In such a case, plaintiff can seek immediate relief in the an-
titrust court which is bound to apply the test of Silver: "The antitrust laws
are to be regarded as impliedly repealed only if necessary to make the Se-
curities Act work, and then only to the minimum extent necessary." 6 9 If the
defendant exchange is unable to establish that the challenged conduct is
necessary to "protect investors" and "to insure fair dealing in the trading of
securities and in the administration of the exchange" he is subject to lia-
bility under the antitrust laws.
PROSPECTUS: SECURITIES ACT AMENDMENT
The practitioner's guide would not be complete without a note regarding
pending legislation which if enacted will have a significant impact on the
practice of law in this area. The omnibus securities bill 70 Win significantly
restructure the relationship between the industry and government by ex-
panding the authority of the SEC to pass upon and to order changes in rules
of an exchange even after the exchange is registered.7 1 This facet of the
legislation will, therefore, require an attorney to seek administrative relief be-
fore resorting to the antitrust court in more instances than is presently the
case.
The most significant part of the legislation, however, is the legislative
abrogation of the fixed minimum brokerage rates by May 1, 1975.72 A re-
cent article 73 in the Wall Street Journal reported that the NYSE refused to
comply with the SEC mandate to adopt rules by the end of October, 1974, for
implementing the fully negotiated brokerage rates74 by May 1, 1975. If
the SEC forces the NYSE to adopt the rule, the exchange no doubt will insti-
tute litigation, 75 the results of which will be a more definitive statement by
the Supreme Court on the relationship between the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and the antitrust laws.
MARY GASSMANN REICHERT
69. 373 U.S. at 357.
70. See Committee Print #1 of H.R. 5050, 265 SEC. REG. AND L. REP. (July 31,
1974).
71. Wall Street Journal, October 11, 1974, at 2, col. 2.
72. Securities Act Release No. 10560 (December 14, 1973).
73. Wall Street Journal, supra note 71.
74. Minimum commission rates apply to trades between $2000 and $300,000; trades
over these amounts or under $2000 are subject to negotiation.
75. The NYSE and other exchanges have sustained significant losses in the last
year. Competitive brokerage rates, it is argued, will increase these losses and ultimately
cause the collapse of the securities industry. See Securities Act Release No. 10206 Qunq
6,1973).
